For two-person, zero-sum games where the probability of each player winning is a continuous function of time and is known to both players, the mutually optimal strategy for proposing and accepting a doubling of the game value is known. We present an algorithm for deriving the optimal doubling strategy of a player who is aware of the sub-optimal strategy followed by the opponent. We also present numerical results about the magnitude of the benefits; the results support the claim that repeated application of the algorithm from both players leads to the mutually optimal strategy.
Introduction
We consider a zero-sum game between two players A and B, in which, at any time t ≥ 0, the probability p(t) that A will win is known to both players. We assume that p(t) is a continuous function of t. The objective of each player is to maximize his or her expected value from the game.
Initially, the value of the game is one unit. Either player may propose a doubling of the game value each time it is his or her turn to play. When one player proposes a double, the other player may refuse the double, in which case the game ends and the refusing player loses the current value of the game, or accept the double, in which case the game continues with twice the value. When a double is proposed and accepted, the player who accepted gains the exclusive right to propose the next double. In other words, a player can not propose two consecutive doubles.
This model may be used to approximately describe a number of gambling games in discrete time in which the value may increase exponentially through repeated use of the doubling device. Backgammon is such a game with many dedicated players.
Intuitive arguments on doubling strategies have been discussed by analytically oriented backgammon experts [1, 4] , but there does not appear to be a consensus on which strategy is the best one [5] . Optimal doubling strategies in backgammon have also been studied formally by applied probabilists [2, 7, 6 ].
Keeler and Spencer [2] showed that, if both play optimally, then A should double when p(t) ≥ 0.8, and should decline B's double when p(t) ≤ 0.2; B's optimal strategy mirrors this. The main tool in their argument was Lemma. Suppose p(t) = p and the game continues indefinitely. Then for s > t, the
Keeler and Spencer [2] also hinted that a player aware of the opponent's sub-optimal strategy can adopt a doubling strategy better than the mutually optimal one. Here, we solve this problem and present an algorithm that, given p(t) and the sub-optimal strategy of the opponent, outputs the adaptive optimal strategy.
In the next section, we state the problem and outline the solution. Then we present the details of the algorithm and provide some numerical results.
The Problem and its Solution
We assume that p(t), the probability of player A winning, is currently p and the maximum value of p(t) at which player B will accept A's double is a and the maximum value of p(t) at which player B will propose a double is d . We seek to determine, for player A, the optimal minimum values of p(t) for accepting (a) and proposing (d) doubles. This is shown schematically in figure 1 .
We consider the situation where d < p < a and a < p < d. These assumptions are reasonable in a number of situations, for example at the beginning of a game between two equally skilled players (then, p = 0.5). We also assume that no doubles have been 
The Algorithm
As stated above, the dynamics of the game depend on the relative values of a and d , and of a and d. Below, we consider each of the four possibilities.
In case I, both players refuse when the opponent proposes a double. Thus, A collects
, and +1 otherwise. Thus, from the Lemma,
In case II, A accepts B's doubles, but B refuses A's doubles. Thus, if p(t) = d before p(t) = d , then A proposes a double which is refused and A collects +1. If
proposes a double which is accepted, and the game terminates when p(t) = d with A collecting +2, or p(t) = 0 with A collecting −2.
Then, application of the Lemma and some simple algebra yields the following:
In case III, A refuses B's doubles, but B accepts A's doubles and we obtain the following equation:
Finally, in case IV, all doubles are accepted, and the game continues until p(t) equals 0 or 1. We will express the expected value of the game for player A conditioning on which player doubles first, or equivalently, on the value of p(t) when the first double is
proposed.
The value of p(t) when the first double is proposed is d with probability 
We make the economically reasonable assumption that each player may double for at most the same finite number of times, n. To compute
, we consider separately the cases where both players double the same number of times, and where player B doubles one more time than A. In equation (5),
is expressed as a sum of three terms. The first two terms refer to the realizations of the process where both players double the same number of times, exactly n in the first term and less than n in the second term. The third term refers to the case where player B doubles one more time
is expressed in a similar manner in equation (6) .
We make the assumption of a maximum finite number of doubles to prevent possible non-convergence of the (otherwise infinite) series in (5) or (6).
An algorithm for computing a and d for d < p < a and a < p < d is as follows:
Step 1: Use (5)- (6) to compute
Step 2: Use (1)- (4) to compute (a
Step 3: Set accepting point a = min a * and doubling point d = min d * .
Output: a, d.
Numerical Results
From the above, three questions naturally arise. Table 1 shows the optimal strategy for player A in the above two cases. Note that the optimal response is often simple, leaving open the possibility that humans might be able to behave optimally or near-optimally. For example, the optimal response to an opponent eager to reject doubles (a < 0.8) is to propose doubles when probability of winning rises just above a by an infinitesimal . Finally, Figure 3 provides a contour plot of the expected game value for player A Player B's strategy Player A's optimal adaptive strategy The last question we investigated is whether the repeated use of the algorithm by both players converges to the mutually optimal strategy. It is known that such an iterative process in a zero-sum, two-player game need not converge [3] . In our case, a formal analysis of convergence is not straightforward because the dependence of a and d on a and d is not captured by a single formula. We have, however, observed convergence in simulations for all settings of a and d in increments of 0.01 (using an value of 0.01).
Summary
We extended previous work on optimal strategies for proposing and accepting doubles in two-person, zero-sum, completely observable, continuous games by considering situations where one of the players, B, uses a sub-optimal strategy. We formally derived an algorithm that the other player, A, may use in order to adapt to B's strategy.
We also provided numerical results for the benefits from the use of the algorithm, and showed how they depend on B's strategy. The results also provide support for the claim that repeated application of the algorithm from both players leads to the mutually optimal strategy.
